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1) A technical framework for p-curve and computing pp-values for null of 33% power.
1.1. P-curve and noncentral distributions
P-curve is closely related to statistical power. Power is the probability of a statistical test
obtaining a p-value<α, where α is typically 5%. One can think of the distribution of significant pvalues, p-curve, as computing power for every possible α between 0 and .05.1
Power calculations rely on “noncentral” distributions, so p-curve calculations rely on
noncentral distributions also. Noncentral distributions are seldom covered by statistics textbooks for
non-statisticians, so we provide a brief introduction to them here. For a more complete yet still
accessible introduction see the article by Cumming and Finch (2001), beginning with the last
paragraph of page 546.
Central vs. noncentral distributions
The central distribution captures how a test statistic is distributed when the null of no
difference is true. The noncentral distribution captures how a test statistic is distributed when the
null is not true. When we speak of “the” student distribution, then, we actually mean the central
student distribution. The central student distribution is used, for example, to assess how likely a
given difference of sample means would be if the true population means were the same. With the
noncentral distribution, in contrast, we ask how likely a given difference would be if the true means
were not the same.
For instance, when the results section of a paper reads, “the means were significantly
different, t(38)=2.024, p=.05,” this

indicates that, if the true means were identical, there is

only a 5% chance that the two sample means would differ by the observed 2.024 standard errors or
1

Though note that p-curve is the density rather than the c.d.f. and it only considers p<.05, so it is the probability of
obtaining a given p-value conditional on it being <.05.
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more. So unless otherwise stated, it implies that t(38) is evaluated for the central t distribution, so
tcentral(38)=2.024, p=.05. With the noncentral distribution, we instead ask how likely is t(38)≥2.024
if the true means differed not by 0, but by, say, one standard deviation from each other (d=1).
The noncentrality parameter (ncp)
While the shape of the central student distribution varies only as a function of the degrees of
freedom (d.f.) of the test, that of the noncentral distribution is also a function of what’s referred to
as the “noncentrality parameter” (ncp), which in turn is a function of sample size and effect size.
𝑛

For the student distribution, ncp=√2 𝑑. This makes intuitive sense: If we want to know how likely a
given observed difference of means is, if the population means differ by some amount d, we need to
take into account what that amount is (d) and how big our sample is (n).
So for example, for a differences of means t-test performed on two samples of n=20 each,
20

and (true) effect size of d=1, the resulting test statistic is distributed t, df=38 and ncp=√ 2 1=3.16.
We hence can answer the question: What is the probability that t(38) will be greater than 2.024
given a true effect size of d = 1, by evaluating the noncentral t(38), with ncp=3.16, at t=2.024. We
do this the same way we find values for the central distribution, looking it up in a table, or running
software that has access to the formulas behind those tables.
For example, to find the p-value associated with tcentral(38)=2.024 we can look up a student
table with 38 degrees of freedom, or rely on Excel’s tdist() function, or rely on R’s pt() function,
etc. Because Excel does not have noncentral distributions built in (as of 2013) we will use R syntax
(with detailed explanations) for the remainder of this supplement.
The pt() function in R gives the c.d.f. for a given t-statistic (that is, the probability of obtaining a
value smaller than that t-statistic). Its syntax is pt(q,df,ncp), where q is the value of the t-test we are

4

looking up. To find the probability of obtaining a value larger than that t-statistic, you simply
subtract that formula from 1: 1 – pt(q,df,ncp).
Thus, to find the (one-sided) p-value associated with tcentral(38)=2.024, we would use the
following r formula:
1-pt(q=2.024,df=38,ncp=0)
= .025. 2
This is the probability of finding t>2.024 given ncp = 0, which is equivalent to the probability of
finding t>2.024 when the null is true (i.e., using the central distribution). This is the one-tailed
probability, and so the two-tailed probability can be obtained by multiplying by 2, which equals .05.
This example shows that, when df = 38, the t = 2.024 represents the threshold for statistical
significance (.05).
Now let’s say that we are interested in knowing how likely we are to obtain a t-value greater
than 2.024 if n = 20 and d = 1, and hence when ncp = 3.16. We would use the following formula:
1-pt(q=2.024,df=38,ncp=3.16)
= .869.
This indicates that there is an 86.9% chance of obtaining a t-value greater than 2.024. Because
2.024 is the threshold for statistical significance, we can say that, given d = 1 and n = 20, there is an
86.9% chance of obtaining a statistically significant result, and thus the “power” of this experiment
is equal to 86.9%. This is precisely how power calculation software uses effect size estimates to
generate recommended sample sizes or estimated power.

2

This page includes two corrected typos identified by Ellen Evers. Corrections took place on 2013/12/12
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If we are instead interested in knowing how likely our t-test is to result in p≤.04 rather than
p≤.05, we would simply look up the value of tcentral(38) that produces p=.04. This value is 2.126. We
now enter the formula:
1- pt(q=2.126,df=38,ncp=3.16)
= .8457. This indicates that there is an 84.57% chance of obtaining a t-value greater than 2.126, and
thus an 84.57% chance of obtaining p≤.04.
Now, if there is an 86.9% chance of p≤.05, and there is a 84.6% chance of p<.04, then the
chance of .04<p≤.05 is 86.9%-84.6%=2.3%. Hopefully, the relationship between ncp, power,
noncentral distributions, and p-curve just became obvious.
Because the distribution of p-values under the alternative is a function only of the noncentral
distribution, which is itself a function only of sample size and effect size, p-curve is a function only
of sample size and effect size. If we know the effect size and sample size, we know the expected pcurve; we know how likely each p-value is for any given effect size.
1.2 Computing pp-values under the null of 33% power
In the main text we introduce pp-values to test the significance of the deviation from an
observed p-curve to a null p-curve. For the null of a uniform p-curve, pp-values are trivial to
compute. They involve “stretching” the [0-.05] into [0-1] by multiplying p-values by 20. For
example, among significant p-values, p≤.04 is obtained 20*.04=80% of the time under the null of
d=0, so pp=.8. In light of the previous discussion it is worth highlighting that we do not rely on
noncentral distributions to test the uniform null, because we are still testing the null of no effect (d
= 0) and that involves the central distribution.
For computing pp-values under the null that a test is powered to 33%, on the other hand, we do
need to rely on a noncentral distribution. In particular, we rely on the noncentral distribution with a
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noncentrality parameter (again: ncp) leading the observed test to have 33% power. This means that
to compute pp-values for the null of 33% power for study i, arising from a given t(dfi)=xi test, we
may follow these three steps:
Step 1. Find the critical value of the student distribution, Xi, for which tcentral(dfi)=Xi, p=.05.
Step 2. Find the ncpi for the tncp(dfi) student distribution that has a 33% chance of obtaining x≥Xi.
Step 3. Evaluate the observed xi with the noncentral t with ncpi.
Let’s consider a concrete example. Imagine that a study’s key test was t(38)=2.126, p=.04. To
compute its pp-value under the null of 33%, we begin by finding the critical Xi for which it is true
that t(38)=Xi, p=.05. We can find Xi using the qt(p,df,ncp) function in R. Using the formula,
qt(.975,df=38,ncp=0) tells us that the critical t-value for one-tailed p = .025 (and hence two-tailed p
= .05), the t-value that exceeds 97.5% of the values under the null, is 2.024.3 We now need to find
the ncp that would make t>2.024 have 33% chance. This function is not built into R but is easy to
build it (in SAS it does exist, it is call TNONCT). We want to ask R something like: Hey R, why
don’t you go find the value of ncp such that: pt(x=2.024, df=38, ncp=???)=67%?
R can do this in three lines of code:4
f <- function(delta, pr, x, df) pt(x, df = df, ncp = delta) - pr
out <- uniroot(f, c(0, 37.62), pr =2/3, x = 2.024, df = 38)
out$root
The output this code produces is 1.568436. So R just told us that if one were to run
1-pt(2.024, df=38, ncp=1.568436),
one would obtain
.3333333.
3

R’s pt() function is like Excel’s tdist(), and R’s qt() function is like Excel’s tinv()). The key difference is that R
accommodates noncentral t’s and Excel does not.
4
That c(0,37.62) command is there because that’s the range of the noncentral parameter which R is able to compute;
ncp>37.62 just would not work, and ncp>37.62 are way too big for our purposes anyway.
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This means that ncp=1.568436 is the noncentrality parameter that leads a test with df=38 to
have 33% power. Now we ask R how likely it is to observe t<2.126 if ncp=1.568436 using the
formula:
pt(2.126, df = 38, ncp = 1.568436)
= . 70127. That’s the probability of t(38)<2.126 (and thus p>.04), but the pp-value is probability of
obtaining p>.04 given that that we have observed a p-value less than .05. To get that value, we first
subtract 2/3 from the above probability; because 2/3 is the probability of p>.05 (since power is 1/3,
there is a 2/3 chance of p>.05), this subtracts out the probability of observing p>.05. We then divide
by 1/3, or equivalently multiply by 3, because we are conditioning on being in one third of possible
values. In short, the formula for computing a pp-value for 33% power given df = 38 and p = .04 is
3*(.70127-2/3)= .10. Thus, a two sample t-test with n=20 per cell has a 10% chance of obtaining
p>.04 conditioning on the result being significant and the test being powered at 33%.5

5

We thank Chad Danyluck for alerting us of some typos in this paragraph in an earlier version of this supplement.
The typos have been corrected (August, 2013).
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The code that follows creates a function in R that computes pp-values, for the 33% power null, for a
t-test with degrees of freedom df_ and observed t=x_
##########################################
pp33 <-function(df_,x_) {
#Find critical value of student (xc) that gives p=.05 when df=df_
xc=qt(p=.975, df=df_)
#Find noncentrality parameter (ncp) that leads 33% power to obtain xc
f <- function(delta, pr, x, df) pt(x, df = df, ncp = delta) - pr
out <- uniroot(f, c(0, 37.62), pr =2/3, x = xc, df = df_)
ncp_=out$root
#Find probability of getting x_ or larger given ncp
p_larger=pt(x_,df=df_,ncp=ncp_)
#Condition on p<.05 (i.e., get pp-value)
pp=3*(p_larger-2/3)
#Print results
return(pp)
}
##########################################
So for example, the last two pages of explanations looking for the pp-value of t(38)=2.126 can now
be performed with the following invocation of the new function:
pp33(df=38,x=2.126)
resulting in
.1034
the pp-value of p=.04 for df=38 is pp=.1034.
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(2) Is p-curve uniform if variables are not normally distributed?
In the paper we assume that the assumptions underlying the statistical tests of interest (e.g., the
two-sample t-test) are met. We focus on the t-distribution (and hence the F distribution with df1=1),
which assumes that the underlying random variables are normally distributed. The literature
contains several demonstrations of the robustness of the t-test to deviations from normality
(Boneau, 1960; Pearson, 1931); nevertheless, we conducted simulations to verify p-curve’s
robustness to non-normality.
We created two small samples (n=15) drawn from the same population, conducted a t-test on
them, and repeated this procedure several thousand times, tabulating how frequently we observed pvalues in each of the five bins (p<.01, .01<p<.02, etc.). We simulated data using distributions that
deviated from a normal distribution by an increasing amount: normal, uniform-continuous (0-1),
uniform-discrete taking just four values (0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1), and a Poisson with λ=2 truncated at
1 and 4. The truncated Poisson leads to a distribution where y takes the values 1,2,3,4 with
approximate probabilities .4, .3, .2 and .1, respectively. Figure S1 shows that, despite the severe
deviations from normality and small sample sizes (n=15 per cell), p-curve is quite close to uniform
for the four different distributions we simulated, with a very slight right-skew tilt.

10

Relative frequency among p-values <.05
(100,000 simulations)

30%
Distribution of dependent variable.

Normal

25%

Uniform
(continuous)
20%

Uniform
(discrete with four values)
Poisson lambda=2
(bounded between 1 and 4)

15%

10%

0.01

0.02

0.03
p-value

0.04

0.05

Fig S1. Observed p-curves from 500,000 simulated t-tests on two small samples (n = 15) drawn
from the same population. Each p-curve represents a different underlying distribution, ranging from
normal to increasingly non-normal. Because 5% of the 500,000 simulations are expected to be
p<.05, each p-curve is based on roughly 25,000 p-values. The normally distributed dependent
variable is N(0,1); the uniform-continuous is (0,1); the uniform-discrete can be y = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
or 1; the Poisson can take values 1, 2, 3, 4 with probabilities roughly equal to .4, .3, .2 and .1,
respectively.
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(3) Modeling p-hacking
Let the {p n}, n∈ℕ, be a sequence of p-values obtained by a researcher. p1 is the first p-value
that is obtained, presumably from the most straightforward test of the prediction of interest, using
the entirety of the data that were collected. If p1<.05 the sequence ends. If p1>.05 a researcher may
engage in file-drawering or p-hacking, which generates p2. If p2<.05 the sequence ends; otherwise,
p3 is generated, etc. In the discussion that follows we refer to the correlation between consecutive pvalues pi, pi-1 (for i>1) as ri.
Uniform p-curve with file-drawering
Because file-drawering involves obtaining new data and entirely disposing of the previous
data, file drawering leads to ri=0 ∀ i, and hence E(pi|pi-1)=E(pi). This means that the expected pcurve is the same in the presence or absence of file-drawering. For example, it is uniform under the
null of no effect.
r>0 with (most forms of) p-hacking.
P-hacking can take a variety of forms, many of which lead to r>0. For example, adding a
covariate, data peeking (adding new observations), data exclusions (e.g., dropping “outliers”),
choosing among several correlated dependent variables, and choosing among several experimental
conditions all produce sequences of p-values generated from statistical tests performed on datasets
with overlapping observations. Thus, these forms of p-hacking generate sequential p-values that are
positively correlated (r>0). A few forms of p-hacking may lead to r=0, such as choosing among
uncorrelated dependent variables, choosing between reporting an interaction or a main effect, or
choosing non-overlapping subsets of data (e.g., comparing treatment 1 with control, and then
treatment 2 with placebo).
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Note that r is not constant for a given sequence of p-values, even if they all arose from the
same form of p-hacking within the same study. For example, when a researcher collects 20
observations and then adds new ones in sets of 10, ri will be increasing in i; as more and more
observations are added, the percentage of data that remains unchanged from test to test increases,
and, thus, so does the correlation between resulting p-values (e.g., a t-test between two samples of
300,000 observations each, and one between the same 300,000 plus a new 10 per cell will lead to
virtually the same result).
Left-skewed p-curves with p-hacking
Considering that pi is obtained only if pi-1>.05, it follows that if ri>0 and pi < .05, then pi will
be “close” to pi-1 and hence not too far from .05. More formally:
E(pi | pi-1>.05, ri>0, pi<.05) > E(pi| pi<.05)=.025
P-curve will be more skewed the higher r is, and moreover,
limr

1 E(pi

|pi-1>.05, pi<.05)=.05.

When the correlation between consecutive p-values is arbitrarily close to 1, then if a p-value in the
sequence is significant (<.05) but the previous one is not, then it must be very close to .05. This
means that p-curves of sets of p-hacked studies will be more left-skewed for p-hacking techniques
that produce more correlated p-values.
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4) The problem with discrete tests, and, how bad is it to ignore it?
4.1 The problem
While the paper focuses on the student distribution, it is straightforward to generalize it to
others like the χ2, the F with df1>1, the normal, etc. This is not so for discretely distributed test
statistics, including χ2 approximations for examining contingency tables (e.g., difference of
proportions tests). Note that while the χ2 distribution is continuous, the distribution of possible χ2
values for any given contingency table is not. A difference of proportions test is only approximately
~χ2 (keep in mind that the normal test for the difference of proportions is identical to the χ2 one).
The discrete nature of a statistical test imposes two challenges for applying p-curve. The first is
that Fisher’s method can no longer be used to aggregate pp-values. This challenge is easy to
overcome as there are well-known methods to integrate discretely distributed p-values (Kincaid,
1962). The second challenge is that pp-values for discrete tests, or at least those based on
contingency tables, depend on a nuisance parameter: the underlying proportions. For example, the
pp-value for a difference of proportions test depends not only on the observed proportions, but on
the true and unknown actual proportions.
The challenge is closely related to a long-standing controversy regarding tests of contingency
tables condition (for extremely interesting reviews see Little, 1989; Yates, 1984). In a nutshell the
controversy arises because when testing if two proportions, say prop1 and prop2 are equal, the result
of a difference of proportions test depends on what we test those proportions being equal to, such
that if we test prop1=prop2=50%, we get a different result that if we test prop1=prop2=30%. What
they are assumed to be equal to is a nuisance parameter, in that it affects the result but we do not
observe it.
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The controversy arises in part also because using Fisher’s “exact” test, which conditions on both
margins (that is, conditions not only on sample sizes but also on the true overall proportion being
exactly the same as that observed across both samples) the resulting p-value does not occur with its
nominal frequency, so Fisher’s exact test results in p<.05 less than 5% of the time. Fisher’s exact
test is conservative.
This, it turns out, reflects a difference in how Fisher and Neyman Pearson interpret p-values.
Fisher did not think it was relevant if 5% of test are p<.05 under the null, Neyman Pearson thought
that was the whole point (for a contrast of both schools of thought on p-values see Lehmann, 1993).
In any case, this nuisance parameter carries over to pp-value calculations and is amplified, such
that the pp-value of obtaining p=.04 in a difference of proportions test between two samples of a
given size, depends on what the two proportions are equal to, and can vary quite substantially
depending on that parameter. In ongoing research we are considering an alternative that defines ppvalues slightly differently for discrete tests, in a way that seems to eliminate this nuisance
parameter. Another alternative is to Monte Carlo / bootstrap false-positive rates for the sample sizes
one is p-curving, see section 4.3

4.2 How bad is it to ignore it
A pertinent question is just how bad is it to blindly compute pp-values on difference of
proportions tests ignoring their discrete nature. We tried to address this question through
simulations. We simulated sets of five difference of proportions test drawn under the null (the
proportions are identical across any two samples being tested), computed the p-value using a χ2(1)
test, computed pp-values ignoring the discrete nature of the distribution, and aggregated the 5
studies to arrive at overall χ2(10) tests for right-skew.
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If the test were ‘valid,’ then x% of simulations would obtain an overall right-skew p<x, e.g., 5%
of them would be p<.05, the p-value would correspond to the false-positive rate. It turned out that
how accurate the p-value captured the false-positive rate depended on sample sizes and underlying
proportions in non-monotonic ways. For example, if n=20 in each of the two samples in all five
simulated studies, and in all of them the underlying proportion is 50% (so we expect 10 of the 20
observations to be 1s, and the other 10 to be 0s), then the nominal right-skew test for the five
studies combined arrives at a p-value that is off on average off by 3 percentage points, e.g., there is
an 8.3% chance of p<.05. If n=22 then the nominal rate is within 0.006 percentage points of the
actual false-positive rate, but that is not thanks to the “larger sample,” consider that if n=24 it is off
by 2 percentage points again.
Basically what’s happening is that the continuous approximation to the discrete distribution will
undulate around the true value, and as sample size changes one can be in the peak or trough of that
undulation (or right in the middle and get it just right). We did not find combinations of parameters
that led to results worse than being off by more than 3 percentage points on average (for nominal
p<.1).
When the set of studies is heterogeneous, e.g., some n=20, some n=22, the gap between the
false-positive rate and the nominal p-value will be in between the extremes of 0 and 3 percentage
points, which is encouraging because in the real world there will be heterogeneity.
We are led to tentatively conclude that until a better approach to p-curving discrete tests is
available, it is reasonable to blindly treat the χ2 as continuously distributed but be aware that the
result is not as precise as it is for truly continuous statistics. It would be best practice to combine
this approximate calculations with Monte Carlo simulations, see section 4.3.
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4.3 Monte Carlo / bootstrap for discrete tests
When p-curves include difference of proportions test we recommend doing Monte Carlo
simulations for studies of those exact characteristics to assess how accurate the resulting overall
tests for skew are for that specific combination of parameters.
So for example, if a p-curve includes three difference of proportion tests studies with samples
pairs of (n1=21,n2=24), (n3=41,n4=41) and (n5=40, n6=40) then we propose simulating studies with
those exact sample sizes, under the null that the proportions are the same within each pair, and
assess how close the nominal p-value for the overall test is to the false-positive rate, this allows
making an informed guess as to how accurate the continuity approximation is for those specific
parameters. One could go a step further and treat the percentage of simulated samples obtaining a
nominal p-value below that observed in the real sample as the bootstrapped p-value for skew.
If a p-curve combines discrete and continuous test statistics one could bootstrap just the discrete
ones and combine the result with that arising from the continuous ones.
This is a tentative solution; its performance ought to be assessed by future research.
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(5) Selection of JPSP studies for the demonstration.
In the paper we plot p-curves for sets of studies published in the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology (JPSP) that we expected to have been intensely p-hacked and that we expected
not to have been intensely p-hacked. Here we provide details of how the papers and p-values were
selected and provide robustness results for their p-curves.

5.1) Set of studies reporting statistical results only with a covariate.
In a recent paper (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) we simulated false-positive rates
obtained by researchers who p-hack by exploiting four specific researchers’ degrees-of-freedom: (1)
data-peeking (deciding whether to continue collecting data based on the statistical significance of
existing data), (2) dropping a dependent variable, (3) dropping a condition (e.g., reporting only two
cells of a three cell design), and (4) controlling for a covariate, especially under conditions of
random assignment.
The first three of these are hard to detect in published research that does not follow our
recommended disclosure rules (Simmons et al., 2011). The fourth, in contrast, is typically
straightforward as authors do routinely disclose if their analyses control or do not control for
covariates. With this in mind we decided to identify experiments using covariates as ones that might
have been p-hacked.
We explored the feasibility of this approach by searching the archives of JPSP, using this
interface: http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=search.defaultSearchForm. After browsing JPSP
articles published in 2011 and 2012 that included the word “covariate,” we defined three rules for
selecting studies and applied those rules to studies published before 2011 (to ensure our rule
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selection was not being influenced by its consequences, as in choosing rules that would favor our
predicted p-curve shape).
Our rules for selecting articles had two main motivations. One was to focus on usage of
covariates that would ex-ante be expected to be associated with p-hacking. The second was to
minimize the subjectivity involved in the selection of p-values. These considerations led us to select
only articles that satisfied all of the following criteria:
1) All independent variables of interest to the researchers were randomly assigned. This rule
excluded, for example, studies examining correlates of personality scales, and those
comparing people of different genders, races, or personality types. Note that this only
applies to the independent variable of interest, not the covariate. Studies that randomly
assigned participants to conditions and merely controlled for gender could be included.
2) The statistical results without the covariate are not reported. This rule excluded, for
example, mediation analyses and robustness checks (e.g., authors examining if their results
also hold when controlling for gender differences).
3) The covariate may not be causally affected by the manipulation. We applied this rule
because when a covariate is correlated with the manipulation, collinearity may result in one
observing a flatter p-curve even in the absence of p-hacking. This rule excluded, for
example, studies that control for mood differences across conditions, if mood was measured
after the manipulation.
We applied these rules to JPSP articles containing the words “covariate” and “experiment” in
the full text, and published before 2011. We sorted the results by descending date and proceeded to
examine papers one-by-one. If none of the exclusion rules applied to the first study using the word
“covariate” in the text, we selected the key result, using the guidelines from Table 3. If any of the
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rules were not met, we made a note of it and moved on to the next article. For simplicity we did not
consider the next study in the same paper. This broad search led to articles from areas of
psychology we were unfamiliar with; on a few occasions we excluded studies because we could not
understand the hypothesis being tested. We registered those instances on a spreadsheet available
upon request. We decided beforehand to collect significant p-values from 20 articles.
5.2) Set of studies expected not to have been intensely p-hacked.
After a similar exploratory process with articles published in 2011 and 2012, we conducted
a search for pre-2011 JPSP articles that included the phrase “Experiment 2” and none of the
following terms: exclude, excluded, suspicion (sometimes participants who express suspicion are
dropped from experiments but the decision to exclude them can be made ex-post), transform (as
when dependent variables are log or arcsine transformed), log, covariate. We included “Experiment
2” because we found it to be useful to help identify experiments in which all variables were
manipulated.
We then proceeded to inspect articles one-by-one, and coded the p-values of articles that, in
addition to the three rules from section 5.1 above, did not make any explicit allusion to the
elimination of data or transformation of variables. This broad search led to articles from areas of
psychology we were unfamiliar with; on a few occasions we excluded studies because we could not
understand the hypothesis being tested. We registered those instances on a spreadsheet available
upon request. We decided beforehand to collect significant p-values from 20 articles.
5.3) Robustness tests for the demonstrations.
As described in the paper, it is important that p-curve include only p-values that both
directly test the stated hypothesis and that are statistically independent form each other. When more
than one p-value directly tests the stated hypothesis but is not independent from another (e.g., when
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t-tests on two correlated measures constitute equally appropriate tests of the stated hypothesis), then
the researcher p-curving the study must decide which p-value to select initially, and then conduct
robustness tests, where the selected p-value is replaced by one that was not chosen initially.
When we encountered this situation in our demonstration, we used the following rule.
We initially selected the first p-value if two were equally relevant and we selected the median pvalue if three were equally relevant. The p-curves and analyses depicted in Figure 3 feature those
initial selections.
For the set with the covariate, Figure 3a, robustness involved a single instance where
authors reported three tests of the hypothesis of interest. In the main text we reported p-curve
results using the median of the three. Replacing the median with the lowest p-value reported in the
triad barely affected the results; the test for lack of evidential value remained highly significant,
χ2(40)=80.5, p=<.0001 (down from χ2(40)=82.5).

For the set without keywords associated with p-hacking, Figure 3b, robustness involved five
instances when the authors reported two tests of the key hypothesis. In the main text we reported pcurve results always including the one appearing first in the text; for robustness we reran the
analyses including only the one appearing second. The overall test for right-skew remained highly
significant, χ2(44)=93.6, p<.0001 (down from χ2(44)=94.2).

21

6) Other statistical tests applicable to p-curve.
In the paper we propose two methods for conducting statistical inference with p-curve: binomial
test of high vs low p-values, and computing pp-values. An alternative worth considering in the
future is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. While it is known to have low power for small
samples (in this case, few p-values), its one-tail version has the great advantage of allowing
simultaneously testing for left-skew and right-skew. So a pair of one-tail KS tests could reject the
uniform null and suggest some studies do have evidential value, and other studies within that same
set were intensely p-hacked. Given our interest in applying p-curve to small sets of p-values we
have not considered it in much detail but it may be useful for meta-analytical contexts.
Future research may also consider central tendency tests on p-curve, contrasting, for example,
the mean or median p-value to those expected under different nulls through parametric (e.g., t-test)
or nonparametric (e.g., Wilcoxon) tests.

22

7) Selection bias as an alternative to p-hacking to explain the ANCOVA example
A referee proposed an alternative explanation for our demonstration with studies reporting only
ANCOVA and not ANOVA results (Figure 3a). If some researchers, call them “choosers,” who
obtain p<.05 with both ANOVA and ANCOVA choose to report the ANOVA result, then our
sample which only includes ANCOVAs, will not include them, obviously.
Importantly, those missing studies are likely to have had low (ANCOVA) p-values, because the
corresponding ANOVA ones were p<.05, and ANCOVAs tend to lead to lower p-values than
ANOVAs. This type of selection bias would lead a set of studies reporting only ANCOVA results
to have fewer than expected low p-values and hence to be less right skewed than otherwise
expected.
We conducted simulations to assess if this type of selection bias could result not only in a less
right-skewed p-curve, but also in a left-skewed one. That is, we conducted simulations to assess if
this hypothetical form of selection bias was a plausible alternative explanation for Figure 3a. Our
simulations involved two-cell studies with n=20 participants per cell and a covariate. We varied
three parameters:
1. Percentage of researchers who are choosers: 25%,50% or 75%
2. Power of ANOVA test: 33%,50% or 80%.
3. Correlation between covariate and dependent variable r(y,z): r = .25,.5 or .75.
Those values of parameters can be combined in 27 different ways. We report all of them in
Figure 2S below. We found that the expected p-curve is markedly right-skew for all of them.
Even under the most extreme assumptions – most researchers are “choosers”, the studies are
severely underpowered, and the covariate is hardly related to the dependent variable – we still
expect a right-skewed p-curve (the green line of the top-left panel in Figure S2). The p-curve we
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actually observe for studies reporting experimental results only with a covariate, in sharp
contrast, is distinctly, and significantly, left-skewed (Figure 3a).
Note that if researchers are ex-ante deciding on employing a covariate (z) to use for a
dependent variable (y), such covariate is likely to have a high r(y,z), and for such situations pcurve is strongly right skewed .
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Figure S2. Expected p-curves from sets of studies reporting ANCOVA where some researchers,
‘choosers,’ are excluded because they report ANOVA instead if it is p<.05.
ANOVA POWERED AT 33%
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ANOVA POWERED AT 80%
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Notes: Each panel reports three expected p-curves, obtained from 20,000 simulations each, for studies reported with
ANCOVA, when some percentage of authors, ‘choosers’, choose to report ANOVA results if they are p<.05 and are
hence excluded from an ANCOVA sample. ANCOVA samples exclude ‘choosers’ when their ANOVAs are p<.05, but
include them otherwise. Each column contains simulations for a given level of statistical power for the ANOVA (the
power for the ANCOVA is always higher of course and increases more the higher r(y,z) is), each row for a given
percentage of researchers being ‘choosers’, and within each panel we consider three possible correlations, ex-ante,
between a covariate and the dependent variable. Note that the percentage of choosers is not the ex-post share of people
exiting, but the percentage that would do so if their ANOVA is p<.05. For example, the top left panel shows that if the
ANOVA is powered to 33%, 25% of researchers would choose to report ANOVA instead of ANCOVA if it came up
p<.05, and the covariate is correlated .25 with the dependent variable, then 33% of p-values for studies reporting
ANCOVA would be p<.01, and 17% would be p>.04.
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Table S1. P-curve disclosure table (PDT) for JPSP demonstration (part 1 of 3), also available as an Excel file from www.p-curve.com
link

Quoted text from paper stating hypothesis
Comments by Simonsohn, Nelson Simmons, in purple

Quoted text from paper describing results
Selected result in bold

Brief description

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/99/6/883.html

The first experiment was designed to be an initial examination of our
prediction that stereotype threat can reduce learning by interfering with
encoding processes. We proposed that stereotype threat reduces women's
ability to learn mathematical rules and operations by reducing their ability
2 (Stereotype threat: control vs. threat) x
to encode mathematical information into memory, not by inhibiting the
2 (learning time; before vs after instructions)
ability to retrieve mathematical information from memory.
(attenuated interaction)
[this is tested by stereotype threat influencing only math rules learn after
the threat. They report first results on remembering rules, then on
performance. We include remembering of rules in p-curve, and report
robustness for the other]

Interaction

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/99/4/573.html

Dissonance theory only predicts spreading in the RCR condition because
the spreading of preferences is considered an effect of choosing. A
preference-driven choice theory, in contrast, predicts positive spreading
for both.
[authors want to know if RRC also leads to spreading, the key test is the
simple effect of spreading in that condition]

two-cell

Simple difference between cells

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/98/6/872.html

We predicted that people would perceive their embarrassing moment as
less psychologically distant when described emotionally.

two-cell

Simple difference between cells

The results for mathematical learning showed the expected two-way
interaction, F(1, 57) = 7.25, p < .01, ηp2 = .11 (see Table 1). As predicted, the
stereotype threat manipulation did not affect women's learning of mathematical
rules presented before the instructions, F(1, 57) = 0.68, p = .41, ηp2 = .01;
however, women in the stereotype threat condition learned fewer
Yes.
mathematical rules presented after the instructions than did women in the
(note: this column is
control condition, F(1, 57) = 3.96, p = .05, ηp2 = .07. Also as predicted, learning
always "yes" when
time did not impact the number of mathematical rules women learned in the
assessing evidential
control condition, F(1, 28) = 0.61, p = .44, ηp2 = .02, but women in the stereotype
value of the finding of
threat condition learned more of the mathematical rules presented before the
interest to researchers,
instructions than the mathematical rules presented after the instructions, F(1,
it may only be "No"
29) = 15.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .35.
when engaging in a
meta-analysis of
The results for math performance also showed a two-way interaction, F (1, 57) =
findings that were not
4.02, p = .05, ηp2 = .07 (see Table 1). The stereotype threat manipulation did not
the primary interest of
affect women's performance on problems that used mathematical rules
original researchers.
presented before the instructions, F(1, 57) = 0.16, p = .69, ηp2 = .00; however,
women in the stereotype threat condition solved fewer mathematical problems
based on the rules presented after the instructions than did women in the
control condition, F(1, 57) = 8.12, p = .01, ηp2 = .13.
[again, we p-curved F(1,57)=7.25 and report robustness for F(1,57)=4.02]
Critically, however, as predicted by a preference-driven model of choice, we
also found positive chosen spread for participants in the RRC condition (M =
Yes.
1.75, SD = 2.66, n = 40). In other words, on average, from Rank 1 to Rank 2, the
item that participants eventually chose also moved further apart in participants'
rankings. This spreading was also significantly different from 0, t (39) = 4.16, p <
.001.
As predicted, participants perceived their previous embarrassing moment to be
Yes.
less psychologically distant after describing it emotionally (M = 4.90, SD = 2.30)
than after describing it neutrally (M = 6.66, SD = 1.83), t (38) = 2.67, p < .025 (see
Table 1).

We measured fixed-pie perceptions prior to the negotiation and then
again after participants had received information about their counterpart's
issue chart (or not, in the control condition). We predicted stronger
revisions of fixed-pie perceptions when negotiators had a high rather than
a low level of construal.

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/98/5/761.html#S-6

Participants would be confirmed in their fixed-pie assumption when they
either did not receive or process information on their counterpart or
focused on issues only. They would revise their initial fixed-pie perception
only when they would receive information on their counterpart and
process the information on underlying interests rather than issues.

2 (Construal: high vs. low) x
2 (Info on other: present vs. absent) x
2 (time: time 1 vs. time 2)
(attenuation of an attenuated interaction)

3-way interaction

Yes.

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/98/4/605.html

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/98/1/29.html

We predicted that the classical effect by Jacoby, Kelley, et al., namely the 2 (exposure: old vs. new) x
misattribution of increased fluency to fame, would vanish under the oral 2 (motor task: oral vs manual)
(attenuated interaction)
motor task but would still be detected under a manual motor task.
[technically one cannot test that an effect vanishes, but one can that it gets
significantly smaller, so we code the attenuated interaction]

Thus, we predicted that participants who were not mimicked would
consume more of the snack than participants who were mimicked.

three-cell (mimicking confederate, nonmimicking confederate, confederate
absent)
Accordingly, we predicted that participants who were not mimicked would (one treatment, two controls)
consume more of the snack than would control participants.
We expected that, consistent with the resource attribution hypothesis, the
feedback would affect individuals in the low and high depletion states
differently. Specifically, participants in the low depletion condition were
expected to use our feedback to interpret their amount of available
2 (depletion: high vs low) x
mental resources and, consequently, to persist longer on our problem2 (feedback: depleted vs. replenished)
solving task when given the replenished (vs. depleted) feedback.
Conversely, participants in the high depletion condition were expected to (reversing interaction)
use our feedback to explain their amount of available mental resources
and, consequently, to persist longer on our problem-solving task when
given the depleted (vs. replenished) feedback.

(7) Robustness
results

F(1,57)=7.25, p=0.0093

F(1,57)=4.02, p=0.0497

t(39)=4.16, p=0.0002

t(38)=2.67, p=0.0111

F(1,77)=5.86, p=0.0178

Fig 1 shows that in the no-information condition, construal level had no effects
on perceptual accuracy at Time 1 or at Time 2. In the information available
condition, participants were more accurate at Time 2 than at Time 1, but this
effect was considerably stronger in the high-construal level condition, F(1, 77) =
72.2, p < .001, η2 = .48, than in the low-construal level condition, F(1, 77) = 9.61, p
< .01, η2 = .11. As a result, participants in the high-construal level condition were
more accurate at Time 2 than those in the low-construal level condition, F(1, 77)
= 3.77, p < .06 (approached significance).

Note: The authors are predicting that the effect of construal on revision
(which is manipulated as time of measurement) will be greater when
information is available than when it is not. This is a 3-way interaction: a
moderated interaction - revision will be greater when construal is high vs.
low - will be stronger under one condition than another (information
availability).

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/98/5/721.html

We submitted fixed-pie perceptions assessed at Time 1 and Time 2 to a 2 × 2 × 2
(Construal Level × Information × Time of Measurement) ANOVA, with construal
level and information as between-subjects factors and time of measurement as
a within-subjects factor. Results revealed a main effect for time of
measurement, F(1, 77) = 34.62, p < .001, η2 = .31; an interaction between time
and construal level, F(1, 77) = 5.91, p < .05, η2 = .07; and an interaction between
time and information, F(1, 77) = 30.52, p < .001, η2 = .28. These effects were all
qualified by the predicted three-way interaction among time, construal level,
and information, F(1, 77) = 5.86, p < .05, η2 = .07.

(6) results

2-way interaction

Treatment vs control 1
(confederate w/o mimicking)

Two simple effects

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Over the fame ratings in the test phase, a 2 (exposure: old items, new items) × 2
(concurrent motor task: manual, oral) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run with
motor task as a between-subjects factor. A main effect of exposure, F (1, 48) =
5.54, p < .023, ηp2 = .10, surfaced, as well as an interaction between exposure
and motor task, F (1, 48) = 4.12, p < .05, ηp2 = .08. The conditional means are
displayed in Table 1.

F(1,48)=4.12, p=0.0479

Planned comparisons revealed that participants who were not mimicked
consumed more grams of cookies than did participants who were mimicked, F (1,
27) = 4.21, p < .05, η2 = .13, and more grams of cookies than did control
participants, F (1, 27) = 5.51, p < .05, η2 = .25.

F(1,27)=4.21, p=0.0500002

In the low depletion condition, participants persisted significantly longer when
given the replenished, as opposed to depleted, feedback, t (30) = –2.52, p < .02.
In the high depletion condition, participants persisted significantly longer when
given the depleted, as opposed to replenished, feedback, t (30) = 2.50, p < .02.

t(30)=2.52, p=0.0173

F(1,27)=5.51, p=0.0265

t(30)=2.5, p=0.0181

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/97/6/946.html

Type of gesture (gestures of approval vs. gestures of disapproval) was the
manipulation. Reported attitudes served as the dependent measure. Role
(participant vs. observer) was the predicted moderator variable. The
central prediction called for a type of Gesture × Role interaction, in which
perceivers would report more positive attitudes after seeing gestures of
approval than disapproval made by someone else toward an attitude
object, but observers who saw the same gestures made by someone else
would not, because observers would not have the same visual illusion and
inferential cues to agency as would perceivers.

2 (Role: perceiver vs. observer)x
2 (Gesture: aproval vs. dissaproval)
(attenuated interaction)
(note: there is a third role condition over which no strong prediction is made:
hand helper)

two-way interaction

Yes.

A 2 (type of gesture) × 3 (role) ANOVA was performed on participants’ answers
to the question about their current attitudes toward gay men, after participating
in the experiment. That ANOVA yielded the predicted type of Gesture × Role
interaction, F (2, 62) = 3.53, p < .05. In addition, an ANOVA that included just
perceivers and observers yielded the same significant interaction, F (1, 31) =
6.73, p < .05

F(1,31)=6.73, p=0.0143
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Table S2 continues (part 2 of 3)
link

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/97/5/823.html

Quoted text from paper stating hypothesis
Comments by Simonsohn, Nelson Simmons, in purple

The prediction that only high identifiers would respond to a heightened
identity threat by giving more help

Brief description

Quoted text from paper describing results
Selected result in bold

2 (group identification: low vs. high) x
2 (threat level: low vs high)
(attenuated interaction)

A 2 (high- vs. low ingroup identification) × 2 (high- vs. low threat) analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on amount of help-giving revealed a Threat × Ingroup
Identification interaction, F (1, 92) = 4.45, p < .05, η2 = .05. To pursue our findings
for the prediction that only high identifiers would respond to a heightened
identity threat by giving more help, we used orthogonal contrasts to compare
helping under high- and low-threat conditions for high- and low identifiers
separately. This analysis indicated that participants in the high-identification
condition gave more help to the outgroup when it posed a relatively high than
low threat to social identity (M = 4.30, SD = 2.40 and M = 2.57, SD = 2.10,
respectively), F (1, 45) = 7.80, p < .01, η2 = .13. The amount of help given in the
high-threat cell did not differ from the amount of help given in the low-threat
cell in the low-identification condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.91 and M = 3.46, SD =
1.86, respectively), F (1, 47) < 1 (see Table 1).

F(1,92)=4.45, p=0.0376

As predicted, a significant two-way interaction emerged, F (1, 32) = 4.46, p < .05.
As illustrated in Figure 1,the active goal influenced the cognitive accessibility of
instrumental versus noninstrumental friends. For participants primed with a
sociability goal, instrumental friends were significantly more accessible than
were noninstrumental friends, F(1, 16) = 19.63, p < .05. Participants in the control
condition showed no such effect; no significant difference in the accessibility of
instrumental and noninstrumental targets emerged (F < 1, ns).

F(1,32)=4.46, p=0.0426

As predicted, participants in the Holocaust reminder condition (M = 2.92, SD =
1.67) reported less collective guilt than participants in the no-reminder
condition (M = 4.14, SD = 2.24), F (1, 52) = 5.08, p = .03, d = .62.

F(1,52)=5.08, p=0.0284

two-way interaction

Yes.

[note: the inro and setup of this experiment give slightly different
predictions, one involves an unreported comparison of one cell against all
three others, the other just the simple effect, but given the design, and
this stated prediction, we are selecting the p-value for the most natural
test: the interaction]

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/95/2/319.html

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/94/6/988.html

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/94/4/547.html

Thus, we hypothesize that when a sociability goal is activated via priming,
the accessibility of various friends should be guided by their
instrumentality for this goal. When no such goal has been activated, we
hypothesize, friend accessibility should not be affected by instrumentality.

We predicted that Jews would perceive Palestinians as being more
responsible for the conflict and legitimize Israeli actions more when
reminded of the Holocaust than when not reminded, and doing so would
lessen feelings of collective guilt.

2 (prime: goal vs. control) x
2 (instrumentality; yes vs no)
(attenuated interaction)

two-way interaction

two-cells

Difference of means
(on collective guilt)

We predicted that presenting these items together in one image would
increase the value of unhealthy (temptation) items, whereas presenting
3 (presentation format: together, single (control) , apart)x
them apart, in separate images, would increase the value of healthy (goal) 2 (food: healthy vs unhealthy)
items.
(rreversing trends)

Two simple effects of high vs low
(because trends including control cell not
reported)

Two-cells

Difference of means
(one of the two cells consists of two
counterabalanced ones that were
collapsed)

It was predicted that more unrequested (negative) cognitions would be
reported in the difficult than in the easy condition.

two-cells

Difference of means

Experiment 1 tested whether answering questions correctly before
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/91/6/1009.html#S-6 attempting to answer them randomly would result in successful random
answers.

two-cells

Difference of means

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/93/4/515.html#S-2

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/93/2/143.html

In Experiment 1, we tested the proposition that a disappointing choice
would be regretted more if it were made from a larger decision set than
from a smaller decision set.

Our main predictions rest on our theorizing that when status relations are
perceived as relatively unstable, dependence on the high-status outgroup
is inconsistent with group members' quest for equality and results in a
threat to social identity. This threat should be expressed in relatively low
affect, drive group members to positively distinguish the ingroup by
discriminating against and devaluing the outgroup, and perceive the
2 (Help: yes vs no) x
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/91/1/97.html#S-5 ingroup and the outgroup as more homogeneous (Studies 1 and 2).
2 (relations status: stable vs. unstable)
(attenuated interaction)
(prediction is cleaer in discussion of results):
When the status hierarchy was perceived as relatively stable, the receipt
of help from the high-status outgroup did not influence recipients' affect,
ingroup favoritism, and perceptions of the outgroup. Yet when the status
hierarchy was perceived as unstable, being helped by a member of the
high-status outgroup led recipients to feel worse.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

A Presentation Format × Food Type ANOVA of these composite value scores
yielded a main effect of food type, F (1, 62) = 5.64, p < .05, indicating that the
healthy foods were more appealing than the unhealthy foods. It also yielded the
predicted Presentation Format × Food Type interaction, F (2, 62) = 12.31, p < .001
(see Figure 2)
A contrast analysis revealed that in the single (control) presentation format,
participants provided similar ratings to healthy food items (M = 4.56, SD = 1.00)
and unhealthy food items (M = 4.18, SD = 1.13), t(23) = 1.17, ns. Thus, we were
successful in choosing healthy and unhealthy food items with a priori similar
value. Moreover, when the items were presented together, participants
provided higher value ratings to unhealthy food items (M = 5.02, SD = 0.76)
compared with healthy items (M = 4.30, SD = 1.04), t(20) = 3.36, p < .01. In
contrast, when the items were presented apart, participants provided higher
value ratings to healthy food items (M = 5.39, SD = 1.27) compared with
unhealthy items (M = 3.65, SD = 1.33), t(19) = 3.79, p < .01.

Contrasts between the conditions showed that there was more regret when
there were two alternatives to going to the movie (M = 5.59, SD = 1.44) than
when there was just one (M = 3.82, SD = 1.73), F (1, 72) = 22.56, p < .001,

As predicted, the number of positive thoughts manipulation had a significant
effect on participants' self-reported unrequested cognitions, t (26) = −4.98, p <
.001. Participants indicated that more negative thoughts came to mind when
they had been asked to list 10 (M = 5.00, SD = 2.04) rather than 2 (M = 2.07, SD =
0.83) positive thoughts.
Participants who were allowed to answer only once, randomly, exhibited a
significantly higher mean proportion of correct responses (M = .58, SD = .15)
than did correct-random participants (M = .49, SD = .12), t (46) = 2.07, p < .05, η2 =
.09 (see Figure 1).

(6) results

(7) Robustness
results

t(20)=3.36, p=0.0031

t(30)=2.5, p=0.0181

F(1,72)=22.56, p=0.00001

t(26)=4.98, p=0.00003543

t(46)=2.07, p=0.0441

(1)A 2 (help vs. no help) × 2 (stable vs. unstable status) ANOVA on the measure
of ingroup favoritism revealed no significant effects. Although the predicted
Help × Stability interaction was not significant, F(1, 63) < 1,

two-way interaction
(for three d.v.s)

Yes.

(2) A 2 (help vs. no help) × 2 (stable vs. unstable status) ANOVA on the general
evaluation score... ... The Stability × Help interaction was not significant, F(1, 63)
< 1.

F(1,63)=3.7, p=0.0589

F(1,63)=8.27, p=0.0055

(3) A 2 (help vs. no help) × 2 (stable vs. unstable status) ANOVA on perceived
aggressiveness of the outgroup revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 63) = 3.70,
p < .05
(4) A similar ANOVA on the perceived homogeneity of the outgroup revealed a
significant Status Stability × Help interaction, F(1, 63) = 8.27, p < .005
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Table S2 continues (part 3 of 3)
Quoted text from paper stating hypothesis
Comments by Simonsohn, Nelson Simmons, in purple

Quoted text from paper describing results
Selected result in bold

Brief description

(6) results

(7) Robustness
results

F(1,45)=7.62, p=0.0083

F(1,45)=16.55, p=0.0002

Participants assigned significantly less collective guilt to Germans when the
more inclusive human-level categorization was salient (M = 5.47, SD = 2.06) than
they did when categorization was at the social identity level (M = 6.75, SD = 0.74),
F(1, 45) = 7.62, p <.01, d = 0.83.
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/88/2/288.html#S-5

two-cell
We expected that Jews would be more willing to forgive Germans for the
past when they categorized at the human identity level and that the guilt
assigned to contemporary Germans would be lower in the human identity
condition compared with the social identity condition.

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/75/2/347.html

Hypothesis 1.1 : When target persons belonging to two different categories
2 (categorical info: nurse vs. stockbroker) x
are presented in a mixed presentation mode, participants will infer that
2 (presentation: mixed vs. blockwise) x
their primary task is to differentiate between the categories.
2 (individuating information: mildly unhelpful vs. helpful)
Consequently, assimilation effects will occur.
(reversing interaction for first 2x2)

Difference of means
(for two d.v.s)

Both simple effects

Yes.
Participants were more willing to forgive Germans when the human level of
identity was salient (M = 5.84, SD = 1.25) than they were when categorization was
at the social identity level (M = 4.52, SD = 0.92), F(1, 45) = 16.55, p <.01, d = 1.20.

Yes.

Hypothesis 1.2 : When target persons belonging to two different categories
are presented in blocks, participants will infer that their primary task is to
note: third factor is not explicitly made a prediction for in the motivation of the
differentiate within the categories. Consequently, contrast effects will
stuy)
occur.

Supporting our hypotheses, nurses were rated as more helpful than
stockbrokers in the mixed presentation condition, t (9) = 2.03, p < .04 (onetailed), which indicates an assimilation effect; nurses were rated as slightly less
helpful than stockbrokers in the blockwise presentation condition, t (9) = 1.69, p
< .07 (one-tailed), demonstrating a contrast effect

t(9)=2.03, p=0.0729

t(9)=1.69, p=0.1253

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/66/1/48.html#S-4

We created a situation in which some subjects were to think that they
two-cell
possessed individuating information about an introverted or extraverted
(two measures)
target without having actually been confronted with such information.
Contrary to other subjects who were not told that they had been informed,
those who believed they had been informed were expected to display
more confidence in their judgments. Also, their ratings should be more
polarized in the direction of the activated stereotype.

three-cell
(treatment 1, treatment 2, control)

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/62/4/699.html#S-5

Difference of means
(for two d.v.s)

Yes.

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/86/2/219.html

2 (category label: chess master vs hairdresser)x
We expected participants to relate the stereotype-consistent behaviors
2 (label: before vs. after)x
more abstractly than the stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Moreover, we 2 (behavior: intelligent vs. sociable)
expected this effect to be more pronounced when the category label was (attenuation of attenuating interaction)
presented before participants heard the story than when the category
label was presented after participants heard the story.

Quadratic trend
(note: this is an unusual prediction and the Yes.
quadratic trend seems a natural way to
test it)

Our primary hypothesis was that although failed counterarguing would
lead to attitudes that were equivalent in valence to those that followed
undirected thinking, the former attitudes would be held with greater
certainty.

Four-cell design
(two expected to show effect, other two are controls)

Three-way interaction

Difference of means
(for focal two conditions)

F(1,55)=9.96, p=0.0026

F(1,55)=8.26, p=0.0058

[polarized:]prediction was supported by the presence of a highly significant
information status main effect for the congruence scores, F(1, 55) = 8.26, p < .006.
In other words, our subjects judged the archivist to be more introverted and the
comedian more extraverted when they supposedly had received individuating
information (M = 9.97) than when no such induction had taken place (M = 6.30)

The first study was planned as a simple demonstration of the hypothesis
that the arousal of any mood state, whether positive or negative, leads to
self-directed attention

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/89/4/504.html

As far as the confidence measure was concerned, the analysis of the don't know
answers revealed a highly significant information status main effect, F (1, 55) =
9.96, p < .003. Subjects who thought that individuating information had been
given to them avoided the questions less often than the other subjects (M s =
5.07 and 10.13, respectively).

Yes.

Yes.

Subjects in the happy mood condition (M = 25.75, SD = 5.42) and the sad mood
condition (M = 24.92, SD = 5.80) scored higher on the Linguistic Implications
Form than did subjects in the neutral mood condition (M = 22.86, SD = 4.85). The
U-shaped pattern of means is congruent with the hypothesis that both happy
and sad moods produce more self-focus than do neutral moods. To confirm this
hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA was conducted in which a quadratic trend was
specified using contrast weights of 1, −2, and 1 for the happy, neutral, and sad
mood conditions, respectively. This analysis revealed that the data fit this
hypothesized pattern of results, F (1, 104) = 5.04, p < .05. The contrast residual,
however, was not significant, indicating that a U-shaped pattern of means, as
predicted by Hypothesis 3, fits the data well.

F(1,104)=5.04, p=0.0269

The only significant effect was the expected three-way interaction between
category label, label presentation, and behavior, F (1, 44) = 8.38, p < .01, η2 = .14
(see Table 1).
The two-way interaction between category label and behavior was significant
only when the category label was presented before the story (an LEB effect), F(2,
44) = 5.05, p = .01, η2 = .18, but not when the category label was presented after
the story, F(2, 44) = 1.63, p = .21. When the category label was presented before
the story, sociable behavior was described more abstractly than intelligent
behavior for a hairdresser, t(9) = 2.80, p = .02, d = 0.91, and intelligent behavior
was described somewhat more abstractly than sociable behavior for a chess
master, t(10) = 1.85, p = .09, d = 0.54.

F(1,44)=8.38, p=0.0059

There was a significant effect of treatment on attitude certainty, F (2, 54) = 4.51,
p =.02. Individuals instructed to generate negative thoughts (M = 7.64, SD = 1.20)
were more certain of their attitudes than individuals who attempted to generate
either thoughts (M = 6.72, SD = 1.20), t (36) = 2.35, p =.02, or positive thoughts
(M = 6.50, SD = 1.26), t (35) = 2.82, p <.01.
[note: there is also a prediction of same valence, that's considered supported in
the paper by lack of statistical significance]

t(36)=2.35, p=0.0244
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